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PRIVATIZING PUBLIC FORUMS TO
ELIMINATE DISSENT
KEVIN FRANCIS O'NEILL*
INTRODUCTION
As the 2008 presidential campaign gets underway,I the
candidates may be tempted to suppress dissent at public forum rallies byS 2
using a tactic that Ronald Reagan pioneered and George W. Bush
perfected . Under this tactic, the candidate's advance team "privatizes" a
public square or public park by securing a municipal permit for the rally
date that authorizes the expulsion of any citizen who manifests support
for a rival candidate.4 At a 2004 Bush re-election rally, citizens who held
signs opposing the President or opposing the war in Iraq were
systematically expelled from a public park by Secret Service agents, who
asserted that the Republican Party "owned" the park for the day.5 Two
citizens who questioned their expulsion were arrested for criminal
6trespass, handcuffed, jailed, and strip-searched.
This tactic for eliminating public forum dissent has generated
7only a handful of reported cases and it has never been successfully
challenged. My thesis is that, under the First Amendment, neither the
Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. In writing this article, I received invaluable help from research
assistants Katsiaryna Vyhouskaya, Maureen Kenny, Deneen LaMonica, and Malvi
Pandya, and generous financial support from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund.
1. See, e.g., Patrick Healy & Jeff Zeleny, Clinton Enters '08 Field, Fueling
Race for Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at A1; Jeff Zeleny, Obama Starts Bid,
Reshaping Democratic Field, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at Al.
2. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 54, notes 58-67, and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
5. McCabe v. Basham, 450 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
6. Id.
7. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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government nor its permittee may effect the viewpoint-based expulsion
of citizens from a traditional public forum. If a presidential campaign
wants to stage an appearance where every member of the audience has
been screened to ensure unanimous support for the candidate, then the
event should be held on private property, where the First Amendment
does not apply. 8
This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I sketch the larger
First Amendment context in which this tactic should be viewed. It is a
context that features two overarching trends: (1) the increasing
obsolescence of traditional public forums as a meaningful platform for
citizen speech; and (2) the broad range of governmental efforts to
eliminate or privatize our traditional public forums. In Part II, I describe
in detail how presidential campaigns have employed this tactic and I
examine the key cases in which it has been challenged. Finally, in Part
III, I offer my own analysis of the tactic's constitutionality.
1. BIG-PICTURE CONTEXT: THE INCREASING OBSOLESCENCE AND
ELIMINATION OF OUR TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUMS
The First Amendment provides vigorous protection for public
protest-so long as the protester takes up position in a traditional public
forum.9 But the list of traditional public forums is a short one. It is
8. Speech restrictions imposed by private actors pertaining to private property
are beyond the reach of the First Amendment. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
567-68 (1972).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (holding that the
sidewalks around the United States Supreme Court building constitute a traditional
public forum and striking down a statutory prohibition against leafleting or
displaying signs on those sidewalks). As one scholar has observed: "[U]nless a
traditional public forum is involved, a majority of U.S. Supreme Court Justices can
easily manipulate the Court's forum classification principles to enable governments
to exclude any private speaker or any type of private expressive activity from
government property." Gary D. Allison, Prelude to a Church-State: The Supremes
Set the Stage for Faith-Based Initiatives, 37 TULSA L. REv. 111, 138 (2001)
(alteration added) (emphasis added). Accord G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the
Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 949, 952, 956 (1991) (noting the
sharp decline in speech protection that attends any shift from a traditional to a
designated public forum); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From
Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1536 (1998) (outside the realm of
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essentially confined to public parks, squares, streets, and sidewalks.'
When given the opportunity to expand that list, the Supreme Court has
consistently refused."
Now, at the dawn of a new century, our traditional public forums
are threatened by two different trends. First, they face increasing
obsolescence as a platform for reaching one's fellow citizens. 12 Fifty
years ago, taking up position on a public square would have been an
ideal way to gather signatures or pass out leaflets. But today, our
traditional public forums are less and less the crossroads of the
community, less and less the setting where we encounter our fellow
citizens on foot. 3 For most Americans, the scene of our daily activity
public parks and sidewalks, the Supreme Court is much less protective of expressive
freedom).
10. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See also United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (stressing that traditional public forums are
narrowly conceived).
11. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678-79 (1992) (holding that the public concourses in airport terminals are non-public
forums, even though they possess many of the same characteristics as public
sidewalks).
12. See Gey, supra note 9, at 1539 (asserting that the importance of parks and
sidewalks as venues for serious discussion of public issues "faded long ago");
Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a
Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REv. 929, 951 (2000) ("In our modern
information age, streets and parks have become less relevant, if not altogether
irrelevant, as sites for public debate or distribution and acquisition of information.").
See generally VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE
END OF PUBLIC SPACE (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992) (tracing the increasing
privatization of "public" space-in the form of shopping malls, sports facilities,
entertainment complexes, and gated communities-and the corresponding decline of
public squares and sidewalks as the scene of human interaction).
13. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 281 (1985) ("Streets are no longer places to promenade and
to meet, but passageways for high-powered machines."); Trevor Boddy,
Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City, in VARIATIONS ON A
THEME PARK, supra note 12, at 123, 124-25 (recognizing the diminishing
significance of public streets as a place of human interaction and a platform for
political protest); Rob Kling, Spencer Olin & Mark Poster, The Emergence of
Postsuburbia: An Introduction, in POSTSUBURBAN CALIFORNIA: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ORANGE COUNTY SINCE WORLD WAR II 1, 7 (Rob Kling,
Spencer Olin & Mark Poster eds., 1991) (the spatial layout of postsuburban
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has shifted from publicly-owned to privately-owned spaces," like
shopping malls, 15 where the First Amendment does not apply. 16
communities "is designed to accommodate the automobile driver," discouraging the
pedestrian use of public sidewalks); Michael Southworth & Peter M. Owens, The
Evolving Metropolis: Studies of Community, Neighborhood, and Street Form at the
Urban Edge, J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N, June 22, 1993, at 289 (identifying trends in
urban design that "preclude the possibility of a pedestrian-oriented environment").
In the words of James Howard Kunstler:
The extreme separation and dispersion of components that
[formerly comprised] a compact town, where everything
was within a ten-minute walk, has left us with a public
realm that is composed mainly of roads. And the only way
to be in that public realm is to be in a car, often alone. The
present arrangement has certainly done away with sacred
places, places of casual public assembly, and places of
repose. Otherwise, there remain only the shopping plazas,
the supermarkets, and the malls.
JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 118-19 (1993) (alteration added). Public
squares and sidewalks no longer provide a meaningful opportunity to communicate,
face to face, with our fellow citizens. Instead, they serve merely as helpless vantage
points from which to view our fellow citizens as they roar past us in sport utility
vehicles at 60 miles per hour. The futility of using these traditional public forums as
a platform for communication has prompted one author to ask: "Where, then, are
you going to have your public assembly? On the median strip of Interstate 87?" Id.
at 120.
As Matthew D. McGill has observed, supra note 12 at 951-52, Justice Kennedy
took note of this trend in arguing for an expansive conception of traditional public
forums. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697-
98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that we now live "in times of fast-changing
technology and increasing insularity" and live "in a country where most citizens
travel by automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than
social intercourse"). Four years later, Justice Kennedy observed: "Minds are not
changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more
significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass
and electronic media." Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
14. See MARK GOTTDIENER, THE THEMING OF AMERICA: DREAMS, VISIONS,
AND COMMERCIAL SPACES 139-42 (1997) (charting "the disappearance of public
space" and its replacement by privately-owned environments in which we live out
our daily lives); KUNSTLER, supra note 13, at 119-20 (recounting the dramatic shift
from public to private space as the scene of daily life in America); Mike Davis,
Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space, in VARIATIONS ON A
2007] PRIVATIZING PUBLIC FORUMS 205
THEME PARK, supra note 12, at 154-155 (describing the "architectural privatization
of the physical public sphere"). "[T]he marketplace had always been a public
space," writes Kunstler, "part of the fabric of the town, usually at the heart of it,
existing in continuity with the rest of town life." KUNSTLER, supra note 13, at 119
(alteration added). But "[b]y the 1970s, when malls started to multiply across the
land, the public realm had pretty much been eliminated from the American scene."
Id. (alteration added). "[T]he mall wasn't really a public space. It was a private
space masquerading as a public space." Id. at 119-20 (alteration added). For Mark
Gottdiener, the mall's preoccupation with profit-making poisons its capacity to serve
as a public forum:
The mall may be the new space of public communion, as
some have suggested, but it functions in that capacity only
within the very restricted context of consumption ....
Primed at home by mass media for self-realization through
consumption, people enter the pseudo-public space of the
themed environment without either political or social
desires, as they may once have in earlier times. They
pursue self-fulfillment in these places in the only way
allowed, through the realization of the consumer role. This
is a far cry from the multidimensional everyday urban life
of the past.
GOTTDIENER, supra, at 142. As Mike Davis reports, the impulse to privatize and
isolate our daily environment has even reached our urban downtowns:
The universal consequence of the crusade to secure the city
is the destruction of any truly democratic urban space. The
American city is being systematically turned inward. The
"public" spaces of the new megastructures and supermalls
have supplanted traditional streets and disciplined their
spontaneity. Inside malls, office centers, and cultural
complexes, public activities are sorted into strictly
functional compartments under the gaze of private police
forces.
Davis, supra, at 155.
15. See JACKSON, supra note 13, at 260 (the central business districts of
yesterday have been eclipsed by the mega-malls of today); Margaret Crawford, The
World in a Shopping Mall, in VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK, supra note 12, at 3, 6-
11 (describing the science of mall design); Witold Rybczynski, The New
Downtowns, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1993, at 98 (surveying the history of
shopping malls, tracing their development as "the new downtowns," and illustrating
the growing obsolescence of traditional public forums). The New Jersey Supreme
Court was keenly aware of this trend when it adopted an expansive interpretation of
the speech clause in its state constitution, recognizing a limited right of expressive
access to the common areas of privately-owned shopping malls:
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This problem is compounded by a second trend: governmental
efforts to divest a public square, park, street, or sidewalk of its status as a
Our constitutional right encompasses more than leafleting
and associated speech on sidewalks located in empty
downtown business districts. It means communicating with
the people in the new commercial and social centers; if the
people have left for the shopping centers, our constitutional
right includes the right to go there too, to follow them, and
to talk to them. We do not believe that those who adopted
a constitutional provision granting a right of free speech
wanted it to diminish in importance as society changed, to
be dependent on the unrelated accidents of economic
transformation, or to be silenced because of a new way of
doing business.
N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,
779 (N.J. 1994). See generally Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal
Courts' and the New Jersey Supreme Court's Treatments of Free Speech on Private
Property: Where Won't We Have the Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589
(2002) (focusing on New Jersey's broad interpretation of the speech clause in its
state constitution); Jennifer Niles Coffin, Note, The United Mall of America: Free
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U.
MIcH. J.L. REFORM 615 (2000) (focusing on the largely unsuccessful national effort
to persuade state courts to construe their state constitutions as affording some limited
right of expressive access to the common areas of privately-owned shopping malls).
See also generally Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in
the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 1 (1999) (lamenting and critiquing the
United States Supreme Court's refusal to extend federal free speech access to
shopping malls, and proposing an alternative theory of First Amendment
interpretation that would afford such access).
16. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). See generally Jason K.
Levine, Defending the Freedom to Be Heard: Where Alternate Avenues Intersect
Empty Public Spaces, 36 U. MEM. L. REv. 277 (2006) (urging an expansive view of
public space that focuses on how the property is actually used rather than who owns
it, and relying upon the Supreme Court's alternative-channels-of-communication
requirement as the basis for enlarging the range of spaces to which First Amendment
protection extends); Josh Mulligan, Note, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City:
Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 533 (2004) (exploring the demise of public space and the rise of private space
as the scene of daily living in the United States and arguing that First Amendment
jurisprudence must respond to this trend by adjusting its conception of the public
forum).
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traditional public forum.1 7 This second trend has appeared in several
different guises:
(a) The government tries to convert a traditional public forum
into a non-public forum. In some cases, the government will attempt to
relegate a traditional public forum to the status of a non-public forum. In
United States v. Grace, 8 for example, Congress enacted a statute that
completely prohibited leafleting or displaying signs on the United States
Supreme Court's sidewalk. The Court struck down the statute, holding
that a traditional public forum cannot be transformed by government fiat
into a non-public forum.19 Grace suggests that the government has no
power to demote a given forum from traditional to non-public status.
This conclusion is consistent with the Court's subsequent holding, in
Frisby v. Schultz,2" that sidewalks do not lose their traditional public
forum status when they reach the tree-lined enclaves of suburbia.
21
United States v. Kokinda22 does not hold otherwise. In concluding that
post office sidewalks do not constitute traditional public forums,23
Kokinda was not addressing a "demotion" scenario; the case did not
involve an effort to relegate a forum from traditional to non-public
status. Instead, Kokinda stressed that post office sidewalks had never
attained traditional public forum status in the first place; that they did not
function in the same way as "public" sidewalks in serving as a traditional
24bastion of public discourse. Thus, Kokinda does not contradict the
holding in Grace that a traditional public forum cannot be transformed
by government fiat into a non-public forum.
(b) When an event is staged within a traditional public forum,
the government asserts that the event is a non-public forum. In some
cases, an event or festival is staged on government property that is
17. I first identified this trend in a brief section of a long article that covered
many different aspects of public protest law. See Kevin Francis O'Neill,
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LoY. L. REv. 411,457-62 (1999).
18. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
19. Id. at 180. The Court concluded that so sweeping a prohibition could not
be sustained under the standard that governs time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech in traditional public forums. Id. at 180-81.
20. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
21. See id. at 480-81.
22. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
23. Id. at 727.
24. See id
2007] 207
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
indisputably a traditional public forum. Rather than arguing that the
property is a non-public forum, the government contends that the event is
a non-public forum. Though such an argument would seem to exemplify
an all-too-clever sleight-of-hand, some courts have accepted it. In
Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Hodel,25 for example, a public
advocacy group was rebuffed by the National Park Service in its request
to include a controversial statue-depicting a homeless man sleeping on
a steam grate-in the Christmas Pageant of Peace, a "national
celebration event' '26 held annually on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C.
The federal district court narrowly defined the "relevant forum" as the
pageant (i.e., the event), not the Ellipse (i.e., the land on which the event
was staged)-and concluded that, since the pageant was a non-public
forum, the Park Service was free to select only "traditional" Christmas
27displays for inclusion in the event. Since the Ellipse is unquestionably
a traditional public forum, identifying the pageant as the "relevant
forum" enabled the court to conclude that a public forum had been
converted into a non-public forum. The government made the very same
argument in Irish Subcommittee of the Rhode Island Heritage
28Commission v. Rhode Island Heritage Commission, but encountered a
very different reaction. The federal district court struck down, as
content-based restrictions on public forum speech, a state commission's
regulations prohibiting the display or distribution of any political
paraphernalia-including political buttons, pins, hats, and pamphlets-at
the Rhode Island Heritage Day festivities. The court rejected the
argument that the festival as a whole (which was situated on the
statehouse grounds) or its booths (from which the plaintiffs distributed
their political paraphernalia) lacked the status of a traditional public
29forum. And it emphatically refused to make the festival the relevant
forum, as if it were a noA-public-forum island in the traditional-public-
forum sea of the statehouse grounds: "To allow the government to limit
25. 623 F. Supp. 528 (D.D.C. 1985).
26. Id. at 529.
27. Id. at 533. The court went on to conclude that the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights would not be violated if they were permitted to erect their statue
on the Ellipse but outside the pageant boundary. See id. at 535.
28. 646 F. Supp. 347 (D.R.I. 1986).
29. Id. at 352-53.
208 [Vol. 5
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traditional public forum property and thereby create within it a non-
public forum would destroy the entire concept of a public forum."
30
(c) The government allows or effects the physical transformation
of a traditional public forum and then asserts that the property can no
longer be regarded as a traditional public forum. In Hawkins v. City &
County of Denver,31 the Tenth Circuit concluded that a former public
street-now converted to a 600-foot-long, open-air, but glass-covered,
pedestrian walkway affording ingress and egress to a government-owned
performing arts complex-was now a non-public forum, notwithstanding
what may have been its status as a traditional public forum before the
transformation.32 But two subsequent decisions have rejected this
physical transformation thesis. In ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las
Vegas,33 the Ninth Circuit held that the city's transformation of several
blocks of downtown Las Vegas into a pedestrian mall did not destroy the
area's status as a traditional public forum.34 And in Venetian Casino
Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas,35 another panel of
the Ninth Circuit held that a sidewalk constructed on private property to
replace a public sidewalk, accommodating pedestrian traffic adjacent to
Las Vegas Boulevard, was a traditional public forum that retained the
36protections of the First Amendment.
(d) The government sells a traditional public forum to a private
entity,37 thereby converting the forum into private property. In perhaps
30. Id. at 354 n.3.
31. 170 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 1287-88.
33. 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1110 (2004).
34. Id. at 1101-04.
35. 257 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 905 (2002).
36. Id. at 948. See Allen Lichtenstein & Gary Peck, Sidewalk Democracy:
Free Speech, Public Space and the Constitution, 8 NEV. LAW. 18 (2000) (describing
the ACLU of Nevada's struggles in the Las Vegas sidewalk litigation and offering a
useful summary of the public forum doctrine).
37. Some municipalities have tried to achieve the privatization of public streets
and sidewalks through a measure that is less drastic than selling them to a private
entity. To combat crime and drug-dealing in a public housing complex, the City of
Richmond, Virginia deeded the surrounding streets and sidewalks to the Richmond
Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), which owned and operated the
complex. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 115-16 (2003). In pursuing this measure,
the Richmond City Council consciously sought to "privatize" those streets and
sidewalks, id. at 115, thereby facilitating the use of a state trespass statute to
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the most heavy-handed example of a governmental entity taking steps to
shut down a traditional public forum, Salt Lake City sold an entire block
38
of Main Street to the Mormon Church. That section of Main Street,
located near the Salt Lake Temple in the very center of downtown, had
served since the 1840s as the site of so many protests and demonstrations
that it was known as "Soapbox Corner., 39  Now that it owned the
property, the Mormon Church could ban assembling, demonstrating, and
picketing there.40 But under the initial terms of the sale, the City retained
a public easement for public access and passage-and, in the first of two
challenges to the sale, the Tenth Circuit held that this easement
constituted a traditional public forum.4 1 Following that decision, the City
sold the easement to the Church, expressly eliminating any right of
public access or passage. That proved decisive in the second challenge.
discourage undesirables from returning there. Id. at 116-17. The Council enacted an
ordinance declaring that the streets in question "are hereby closed to public use and
travel and abandoned as streets of the City of Richmond." Id. at 115-16. The deed
required RRHA to create the appearance that the streets and sidewalks were no
longer public, so it posted signs that declared: "YOU ARE NOW ENTERING
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND STREETS OWNED BY RRHA. UNAUTHORIZED
PERSONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO ARREST AND PROSECUTION." Id. at 116.
But RRHA was itself a governmental entity, so the deeding of the streets and
sidewalks did not actually result in their transfer to private ownership. Id. at 117-
118. In Hicks, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment overbreadth
challenge to the trespass policy without expressly deciding whether the "privatized"
streets and sidewalks should be analyzed as retaining their status as a traditional
public forum. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 360
(2003). One commentator, expressing disappointment at the Court's failure to
address this issue, asserted that "nominal street privatizations, like those at issue in
Hicks, do not alter the constitutional calculus that normally applies to public streets
and sidewalks." Id. at 369. 1 emphatically agree-especially in a fact pattern like
Hicks, where no gates or barricades to outside traffic were erected, where the streets
and sidewalks were not physically altered in any way, and where they remained just
as accessible to foot and vehicular traffic as before the transfer of ownership. See id.
at 361.
38. John Ritter, Mormons' Property Buy Challenged, USA TODAY, Nov. 23,
1999, at 3A (describing the sale and the subsequent constitutional challenges brought
by the ACLU).
39. Id.
40. Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.
2005).
41. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d
1114, 1131 (1Oth Cir. 2002).
210 [Vol. 5
2007] PRIVATIZING PUBLIC FORUMS 211
The Tenth Circuit held that because the Church was now the exclusive
owner of the property, the street could no longer be regarded as any sort
of public forum. It was beyond the reach of the First Amendment. Thus,
the Church was free to ban speech there because it was not engaging in
state action.42
(e) The government issues a permit by which a traditional public
forum is temporarily turned over to a private actor who then enjoys the
power to exclude citizens based on their viewpoints. During the last
several election cycles, presidential campaigns have quietly pioneered a
new method of privatizing traditional public forums in order to stifle
dissent at outdoor rallies. In these scenarios, the campaign committee (a
private actor) secures a permit from a municipality to use a traditional
public forum (usually a public square) as the venue for a speech by the
candidate.43 The committee then treats the forum as if it were private
42. Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1255.
43. See, e.g., Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a municipality could lease its town commons, a traditional public
forum, to the Bush-Quayle '92 Campaign for the purpose of holding a campaign
rally, and that the organization could in turn make attendance at its rally conditioned
upon surrendering any visible expression of support for the opposing candidate); id.
at 199-200 (rejecting First Amendment claims by high school student who was
stripped of her "Clinton for President" button as a precondition for admission into
the campaign rally); Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84 Comm., No. 86-3287, 1987 WL
35970 (6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment
for defendants-Cincinnati police, Secret Service agents, and local and national
members of the Reagan-Bush campaign committee-who had excluded plaintiff
protesters from attending a campaign rally in Cincinnati's Fountain Square unless
they surrendered all signs critical of the Reagan Administration); McCabe v.
Basham, 450 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (dismissing two defendants-the
Secret Service and Homeland Security directors-for lack of in personam
jurisdiction, never reaching the First Amendment merits of a lawsuit alleging
viewpoint-based expulsion from George W. Bush re-election rally in public park);
Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995), affd
mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting First Amendment claims by two AIDS
activists who, while attending a campaign speech by President George Herbert
Walker Bush in a traditional public forum, were ejected and arrested after silently
unfurling a banner critical of Bush's policy on AIDS); id. at 1215-16 (flatly rejecting
the contention that, in granting the Bush campaign a permit to conduct its rally on
the Strongsville Commons-a traditional public forum-the town thereby converted
the Commons into a non-public forum during the President's speech); id at 1219
(but holding that government has the power to eject counter-demonstrators from
property, excluding citizens who oppose the candidate and making
attendance at the rally conditioned upon surrendering any visible
expression of support for the candidate's rival.4  Whether a traditional
public forum may be "privatized" in this way has divided the courts.
Emblematic of the split are two cases that stem from the same campaign
rally-Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville45 and Schwitzgebel v. City of
Strongsville 6-in which one court endorsed and the other rejected a
"privatization" thesis.
0q The government temporarily privatizes a traditional public
forum by granting itself a permit to occupy the forum on a specific
occasion. In Mahoney v. Babbitt,47 the National Park Service attempted
to privatize certain sidewalks lining the route of President Clinton's
inaugural parade, with a view toward thwarting anti-abortion protesters
who sought to display banners there. As the D.C. Circuit described it,
"the government granted itself a permit for the sidewalks from which it
then sought to ban the 'inconsistent' First Amendment-protected
48
activity" of the anti-abortion protesters. Siding with the protesters, the
court flatly refused "[to] permit the government to destroy the
[traditional] public forum character of the sidewalks along Pennsylvania
Avenue by the ipse dixit act of declaring itself a permittee. ''49 The court
emphatically concluded that "there is no authority for the proposition that
the government may by fiat take a [traditional] public forum out of the
protection of the First Amendment by behaving as if it were a private
actor." 50  Mahoney appears distinguishable from Sistrunk and
Schwitzgebel in one important respect: The latter cases involved private
permittees, while Mahoney involved the government itself occupying a
traditional public forum and excluding citizens based on the viewpoint of
even a traditional public forum if their expression impinges upon that of a speaker
already ensconced there by means of a permit).
44. See Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Bishop, 1987 WL 35970 at *1; Schwitzgebel,
898 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
45. 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir.
1996). I devote greater attention to these cases in the next section of this article.
47. 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 1457.
49. Id. at 1458 (alterations added).
50. Id. at 1457 (alteration added).
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their intended expression. In this sense, Mahoney is the easier case;
while the censorship in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel was carried out by
private actors with governmental acquiescence, the censorship in
Mahoney was committed directly and affirmatively by the state.51
In the following section, I will focus on the Sistrunk/
Schwitzgebel line of cases identified in paragraph (e), with a view toward
analyzing the particular First Amendment issues that arise when
presidential campaigns seek to eliminate dissent at outdoor rallies by
"privatizing" traditional public forums.5 2
II. THE PROBLEM: EFFORTS BY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS TO
ERADICATE ANY TRACE OF DISSENT AT OUTDOOR RALLIES BY
TEMPORARILY "PRIVATIZING" TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORUMS
53
We have all seen it on the evening news: the presidential
campaign rally in an outdoor, downtown setting. Carefully packaged and
smoothly choreographed, it is designed to accomplish one objective-to
create the illusion of a candidate whom everyone loves, a juggernaut
rolling to certain victory. The adoring crowd looks like a random
collection of citizens from all walks of life and every political stripe. But
nothing could be further from the truth. The audience has been
rigorously cleansed of every potential dissenter. It has been hand-picked
to contain only the most faithful supporters. 54 This spectacle is not so
51. Lurking here-but so far avoided by the courts, see, e.g., Sistrunk v. City
of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996)--is the question of state action: Is
the First Amendment even implicated when a private permittee ejects other speakers
from a public forum? I discuss the state action issue in footnote 69, infra.
52. In future articles, I will return to this general topic-governmental efforts
to divest a public square, park, street, or sidewalk of its status as a traditional public
forum-and take up one or more of the other categories set forth above.
53. This article focuses solely upon campaign rallies that are staged in
traditional public forums-public squares and public parks. I am not addressing
rallies that are staged on private property (e.g., a church or a hotel ballroom) or on
public property that likely constitutes a non-public forum (e.g., the gymnasium of a
public high school).
54. See Joshua Green, Company, Left, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb.
2006, at 40 (describing the "KGB-style interrogation" and ejection of potential
dissenters that is "sadly characteristic of [George W.] Bush campaign events"
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much an actual campaign rally as a theatrical performance for the
television cameras--even the audience members are actors playing a
role.
Every election cycle brings a new spate of these rallies. Ronald
Reagan pioneered them.55  George Herbert Walker Bush56 and Bill
Clinton57 employed them. And George W. Bush has taken them to a new
58level-especially in the zeal of his staff to eradicate any hint of dissent.
Typically, attendance at a Bush campaign rally is forbidden unless the
attendee has somehow managed to secure a ticket.59 These tickets are
(alteration added)); Richard Benke (Associated Press), New Mexico GOP to
Continue Asking for Pledge (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://www.boston.cor/ne
ws/politics/president/articles/2004/08/05/nmgop tokeepscreeningfor busheve
nts?mode=PF (the Republican Party of New Mexico screened audience members for
Bush-Cheney campaign appearances by withholding admission until each attendee
had signed a pledge supporting Bush's re-election as President); Kelly Beaucar
Vlahos, Screening Tactics at Bush Events Questioned, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,153720,00.html (describing the great lengths
to which George W. Bush's staffers will go in screening and ejecting any person
whose political views may not match the President's. Three audience members at a
Denver appearance were forced to leave when the Secret Service found a bumper
sticker on their car that read "No More Blood for Oil."); Bill Cook, Assistant City
Attorney for Farmington, New Mexico, telephone interview with the author, Oct. 20,
2004 (confirming from first-hand experience that screeners for Bush campaign
appearances in New Mexico had turned away all Democrats who wished to attend,
even if they were not wearing buttons, carrying signs, or otherwise manifesting any
support for a rival candidate).
55. See Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84 Committee, No. 86-3287, 1987 WL 35970
(6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (reflecting efforts by the Reagan-Bush campaign to
eliminate any signs from a public square rally that manifested support for a rival
candidate).
56. See Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996) (reflecting
efforts by the Bush-Quayle campaign to eliminate from a public square rally any
visual manifestation of criticism for the Bush Administration or support for any rival
candidate); Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio
1995), aff'd mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
57. See Rob Eure, Nader Supporters Upset at Ban on Signs at Clinton Rally
Site, PORTLAND OREGONIAN (Sept. 25, 1996), available at 1996 WL 11387928
(describing efforts by the Clinton-Gore campaign to cleanse their public square
rallies of any visual signs of support for a rival candidate); John Lazo, Jr., Dissent
Isn't Part of the Political Package, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Oct. 29, 1996,
at lOB (same).
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. Benke, supra note 54; Vlahos, supra note 54.
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usually issued by local officials of the Republican Party. 60 To receive a
ticket, it is often necessary to perform some volunteer work for the local
Bush campaign or to fill out a questionnaire, disclosing your home
61
address, your e-mail address, and your Social Security number.
Finally, some Republican Party officials during the last election imposed
yet another prerequisite: Applicants were denied a ticket unless they
agreed to sign an endorsement pledge affirming their support for
62President Bush's re-election. In New Mexico, the official pledge was
worded as follows: "I ... herby [sic] endorse George W. Bush for re-
election of [sic] the United States. 63 One man who refused to take this
pledge (and was therefore denied tickets) said that he had also been
quizzed about his political views and affiliations. Specifically, he was
asked whether he associated with pro-life, gun rights, veterans, or teacher
organizations. 64 Moreover, he was asked to disclose his driver's license
65
number for a background check by the Secret Service. Even if the
applicant survives all this scrutiny and manages to secure a ticket, he can
still be ejected for harboring the "wrong" political viewpoint-no matter
how minutely or invisibly that viewpoint is reflected on his clothing or
possessions. At a Minnesota campaign rally, a high school student
holding a ticket was ordered to leave when staffers discovered a John
Kerry sticker on his wallet.66 One wonders just how visible that wallet
sticker would have been to the television cameras. At a Denver event,
three young adults had gained admission with tickets and were
peacefully awaiting President Bush's arrival when they were forced to
leave. They were neither carrying nor wearing any visible message
suggesting antagonism toward the President. But Secret Service agents
had traced them to a car that bore an anti-war bumper sticker-"No More
Blood for Oil"67-and that was enough to trigger their ejection.
The success of these rallies depends on their ability to convey
the illusion of unanimous support for the candidate. This means that
60. Benke, supra note 54.
61. Vlahos, supra note 54.
62. Benke, supra note 54.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Green, supra note 54.
67. Vlahos, supra note 54.
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when rallies are staged in a traditional public forum, citizens who would
normally be free to attend must be carefully screened and excluded if
they fail to possess the "correct" viewpoint. Under the First
Amendment, viewpoint-based exclusions from a traditional public forum
are unconstitutional if effectuated by the government. 68 But here, of
course, the screenings and exclusions are carried out by a private actor
(the campaign committee), not by the government. 69 That private actor
enjoys temporary control over the forum thanks to a permit issued by the
municipality. From a First Amendment perspective, what is the effect of
the granting of the permit? Does it privatize a traditional public forum
during the period in which the campaign rally occupies that forum?
There are very few cases that address this question and they do not agree
on the answer. (The paucity of case law is surprising given the high
visibility of presidential campaigns and the howls of protest that
frequently attend the viewpoint-based ejections of would-be spectators.)
The leading cases are Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville70 and Schwitzgebel
v. City of Strongsville.71 Let us take a closer look at them.72
68. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).
69. This raises the question of state action: Is the First Amendment even
implicated when a private actor ejects other speakers from a public forum? I think
the answer here is yes-state action does exist and the First Amendment does
apply-because the private actor owes its presence in the forum to a government-
issued permit. When a municipality grants one of these permits to a presidential
campaign, the municipal officials know perfectly well that the campaign will utilize
the permit to exclude any citizen who is not a loyal supporter of the candidate. See
Vlahos, supra note 54; Benke, supra note 54. Thus, the government issues these
permits with the knowledge that they will be used to impose viewpoint-based
restrictions on access to a traditional public forum. This situation falls within the
"entanglement" exception to the state action doctrine, which holds that state action
exists when the government affirmatively facilitates private conduct that violates the
Constitution. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.4.4.3, at 527 (3d ed. 2006). Since campaign officials are using their
permit to regulate expressive access to government property, the situation falls just
as readily into the other major exception to the state action doctrine-the "public
functions" exception, which applies when traditional powers of government are
exercised by a private entity. Id. at § 6.4.4.2, at 518-19.
70. 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).
71. 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995), aff'd mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir.
1996).
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Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel both involve an October 28, 1992
campaign speech by George Herbert Walker Bush. The outdoor rally
was staged in a traditional public forum, the Strongsville Commons, that
Bush campaign officials purported to control by virtue of a one-dollar
permit issued by the city. 73 In both cases, the plaintiffs sought to engage
in silent dissent-only to be censored in ways that would never be
permissible in a traditional public forum. The Sistrunk plaintiff, a high
school student, was stripped of her "Clinton for President" button as the
74price for access to the Commons. In Schwitzgebel, two men were
ejected and arrested after silently unfurling a banner critical of Bush's
policy on AIDS.75 Though both courts agreed that dissenters may be
excluded from such a rally,76 they split on the "privatization" thesis, with
Sistrunk endorsing77 and Schwitzgebel rejecting 78 it.
Sistrunk held that the First Amendment does not prevent a
municipality from granting a permittee "exclusive use" of a traditional
public forum.79 Unfortunately, the opinion is less than clear about its
theoretical underpinnings. Left unanswered is whether the public nature
of the forum is altered by the permit, or whether the "exclusive use"
enjoyed by the permittee is simply a necessary concomitant of its
expressive "autonomy."8 ° In any event, the upshot of Sistrunk is that a
permittee is free to use a traditional public forum as if it were private
property--engaging in viewpoint-based censorship that would be legally
impermissible even in a non-public forum.81
Schwitzgebel, by contrast, expressly rejects the notion that a
permit in any way alters the First Amendment status of a traditional
72. In laying out the background on Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel, my exposition
borrows heavily from the article in which I first identified these cases. O'Neill,
supra note 17, at 460-61.
73. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212.
74. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 196.
75. Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
76. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198-200; Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1216-19.
77. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198.
78. Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
79. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 198.
80. Id. at 200.
81. In a non-public forum, speech restrictions are analyzed under a
reasonableness test, unless they are viewpoint-based. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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12public forum. Concluding that the city's issuance of a permit to the
Bush Campaign did not, even temporarily, relegate the Commons from
traditional to non-public status, the court observed:
To allow the government to transform a
traditionally public forum into a non-public forum
is to allow the government to suspend, if only
temporarily, the existence of an historically
protected arena used to safeguard the
communication of thoughts between free citizens.
In essence, public [forums] serve as bulwarks
protecting the right of all persons, especially those
who have no access to any other outlet, to speak
their minds freely. Courts must not allow the
government to overcome the bastions protecting
such an important right through so simple an
83
exercise as the granting of a permit.
Thus, held the court, a permittee's ejection of dissenting voices
from a traditional public forum must be analyzed under the same First
Amendment standards that normally apply to restrictions on public
forum speech.84
Given the profoundly speech-protective language quoted above,
it is ironic that the Schwitzgebel court arrived at a speech-restrictive
conclusion-finding no First Amendment violation in ejecting, arresting,
and jailing two citizens who peacefully and silently expressed their
disagreement with the policies of a presidential candidate at an outdoor
campaign speech in a traditional public forum. To achieve this result, the
Schwitzgebel court performed a tortured time, place, and manner
analysis-identifying a significant governmental interest in preventing
the "cacophony"8 5 of conflicting messages (a curious choice of words,
since the plaintiffs were holding their banner in silence), and concluding
that the ejection of a rival viewpoint from a traditional public forum does
86
not offend the content-neutrality requirement.
82. Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
83. Id. at 1216 (alteration added).
84. Id. at 1216-17.
85. Id. at 1217, 1219.
86. Id. at 1219.
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Thus, even though they disagree on the power of government to
divest a space of its traditional public forum status, Sistrunk and
Schwitzgebel arrive at the same result: When a speaker, by means of a
permit, is ensconced in a traditional public forum, that forum is
magically transformed into a "no dissent" zone. This strikes me as an
unsatisfactory outcome, one that is difficult to square with the letter and
the spirit of the public forum doctrine. If these cases are somehow
correct-if a public forum permittee really is empowered to indulge in
viewpoint-based exclusions of other citizens-I do not believe that either
one of them employed the right analysis in reaching that conclusion. So
in the next section of this article, I will attempt a First Amendment
analysis of my own.
III. ANALYSIS
Let us begin by recognizing that the public forum doctrine
governs expressive access only to government-owned property,87 while
presidential campaigns remain entirely free to stage their rallies on
private property. To the extent that these campaigns want to engage in
viewpoint-based discrimination in selecting who may attend a rally, they
risk offending the First Amendment by staging that rally in a traditional
public forum. By contrast, they can discriminate to their hearts' content
on private property, where there are no comparable limitations on their
power to exclude. 88 Why not simply rent out a hotel ballroom and
restrict the guest list to those individuals who have submitted to a
microscopic examination of their political loyalty? There is nothing in
the First Amendment to forbid such a strategy. But a presidential speech
in a hotel ballroom does not create the same impression on the television
audience as the outdoor rally in a public square. And this is why the
presidential campaigns will persist in the staging of public square rallies.
Those rallies create the illusion of general popular support for the
candidate-support that transcends party lines. The speech in the hotel
87. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-
79 (1992) (adopting the public forum doctrine to assess restrictions that the
government seeks to place on expressive access to government property).
88. See Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (holding that
speech restrictions imposed by private actors pertaining to private property are
beyond the reach of the First Amendment.).
ballroom is loaded with very different connotations. Its whole
atmosphere evokes one-thousand-dollar-a-plate dinners, fat cats, and
party insiders. Presidential campaigns will keep returning to traditional
public forums because the televised image of a rally in such a forum is
uniquely capable of suffusing a candidate with the aura of widespread
support. But that aura will vanish if the candidate is heckled, booed, or
confronted with hand-held signs that criticize him. Thus, traditional
public forums are attractive to presidential campaigns only to the extent
that they can be cleansed of dissent-only to the extent that they can be
made to function like a movie studio's back lot.
Is Sistrunk correct that a municipality's grant of a permit
effectively privatizes a traditional public forum? 89 This view strikes me
as untenable, given the lesson of United States v. Grace that a traditional
public forum cannot be transformed by government fiat into a non-public
forum.90 Recent cases-like ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas9 1 and
92Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas -
hold that even the physical transformation of such a space does not alter
its status as a traditional public forum.9 3 When coupled with Grace,
these cases indicate that it is simply incorrect, as a matter of law and fact,
to assert that the mere granting of a permit to use a traditional public
forum somehow "privatizes" that forum, even temporarily. As a
practical matter, the permittee does enjoy a superior right of access to
that forum vis-A-vis other speakers. But it is highly questionable whether
the permittee has any legal right to engage in the systematic, viewpoint-
based exclusion of audience members that is practiced by the presidential
campaigns. After all, the forum remains public property,
notwithstanding the permit. And it is not just any type of government-
89. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 198 (6th Cir. 1996).
90. 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
91. 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1110 (2004).
92. 257 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 905 (2002).
93. See ACLU of Nevada, 333 F.3d at 1103 (holding that the transformation of
a city street into a pedestrian mall by a private corporation did not alter its status as a
public forum); Venetian Casino, 257 F.3d at 944-48 (holding that a casino's
agreement with the city to relocate a public sidewalk onto casino property did not
convert the sidewalk to a nonpublic forum).
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owned property. It is not a military arsenal. It is not a nuclear weapons
test site.95 It is not an elevator in a federal building.96 It is not a corridor
in the Pentagon.97 In other words, it is not the type of government-
owned property to which protesters have long been excluded for the
reason that it is incompatible with "unrestrained communication. 9 8 We
are talking here about a public square-about a type of public property
that, "by long tradition," has been set aside for "assembly and debate." 99
This public space, this traditional public forum, does not lose its public
character through the mere issuance of a permit. It is not suddenly
transformed into a country club or a corporate boardroom.
From a practical standpoint, the permittee is simply granted a
temporary privilege to use that space as a platform for expression. But
let us be clear about the purpose of that permit. It affords a platform to
speak to the citizens who are there-to the citizenry at large. It is
certainly not a license to close the forum-to treat it as the permittee's
private preserve, like the outdoor equivalent of a hotel ballroom.
Nothing in the public forum doctrine says that the speaker can import his
own hand-picked audience-that the speaker somehow has the power to
94. See United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming
federal trespass convictions of anti-nuclear protesters who staged an unauthorized
demonstration at the Rock Island Arsenal and holding that a military arsenal is not a
public forum); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that
military bases are non-public forums and rejecting a challenge to a base regulation
that banned all speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature).
95. See Hale v. Dep't of Energy, 806 F.2d 910, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge by nuclear weapons protesters to Energy
Department regulations governing demonstrations at the Nevada Nuclear Weapons
Test Site).
96. See United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015, 1016, 1022 (1st Cir. 1982)
(upholding conviction of anti-draft protester who sat down in federal building
elevator and obstructed its use); see also United States v. Sroka, 307 F. Supp. 400,
402 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (rejecting First Amendment defense by anti-war protesters
who assembled in a federal building corridor to read the names of soldiers killed in
Vietnam and, upon the close of business, refused to leave the building).
97. See United States v. Shiel, 611 F.2d 526, 527-28 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming
defendant's conviction for lying down in a Pentagon corridor during a nuclear arms
protest).
98. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing
the characteristics of a non-public forum).
99. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(describing the characteristics of the traditional public forum).
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exclude the very citizens who happen to be downtown and want to hear
what the speaker has to say. Why create a doctrine affording special
speech access to certain heavily-traveled public spaces if the speaker is
going to use that platform to communicate not with the public at large
but with a privately-invited, hand-picked audience from whom the
general public is rigorously segregated?
Expelling the general public from a public square and importing
a privately-invited, hand-picked audience to populate a presidential
campaign rally cannot be justified by analogizing the rally to a parade. A
presidential campaign committee might be tempted to make this
argument in light of the expressive autonomy that the Supreme Court
conferred upon parade organizers in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.100 In Hurley, the Court held
that Massachusetts could not invoke its public accommodations law to
force the private organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade to include a
contingent of Irish gays and lesbians, whose very presence in the parade
would impart a message that the organizers did not wish to convey.101
Compelling the inclusion of that group would effectively alter the
expressive content of the organizers' parade, thereby violating the First
Amendment as a species of compelled speech. 102 The key holding in
Hurley is that the "selection of contingents to make [up] a parade" is
entitled to full First Amendment protection, no less than the editorial
compilation of viewpoints on a newspaper's opinion pages. 103 Armed
with this holding, a presidential campaign might argue that its selection
of audience members is akin to the selection of parade contingents in
Hurley. But this analogy simply won't work. Hurley stressed that
parades are inherently expressive, 1°4 but the same cannot be said of the
audience at a campaign rally. Audience members are basically reacting
to the speaker at the podium, while parade contingents are far more
affirmatively projecting their own particular viewpoints. At a campaign
rally, the expressive content emanates from the candidate, not from the
audience. At a parade, the expressive content emanates from the
100. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
101. Id. at 579.
102. Id. at 574-75.
103. Id. at 570 (alteration added) (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
104. Id. at 568-69.
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marchers, from the different contingents that file past us-and each
contingent often expresses a highly individualized, if not unique,
message. Meanwhile, the audience at a campaign rally merely echoes or
endorses the viewpoints that emanate from the podium.
Thus, Schwitzgebel is certainly correct in holding that a
permittee's ejection of dissenting voices from a traditional public forum
must be analyzed under the same First Amendment standards that
normally apply to restrictions on public forum speech. 10 5  But
Schwitzgebel leapt from that holding to a less credible conclusion-
namely, that viewpoint-based discrimination by the campaign committee
should be governed not by strict scrutiny but by the intermediate scrutiny
normally reserved for content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions. 1 6  Under the normal application of the public forum
doctrine, strict scrutiny would govern the type of viewpoint-based
discrimination that the presidential campaigns employ. 0 7 But even if we
follow Schwitzgebel's lead and apply intermediate scrutiny, a
constitutional violation seems just as likely-because intermediate
scrutiny requires content neutrality,0 8 and the ideological screening
practiced by the presidential campaigns is anything but content-neutral.
In restricting access to the forum, their whole purpose is to prevent the
expression of any rival viewpoint. They won't even permit the silent
105. Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208, 1216-17 (N.D.
Ohio 1995), aff'd mem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996). This holding is consistent
with the requirements of the state action doctrine. My state action analysis appears
in footnote 69, supra.
106. Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1216-17.
107. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995) (Governmental restrictions on the content-much less the viewpoint-of
traditional public forum speech are presumptively unconstitutional; they will be
struck down unless shown to be "necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a
compelling state interest." Id. at 761.).
108. Traditional public forums can be regulated only via content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions. To survive judicial scrutiny, such restrictions must
be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech," "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," and must "leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information." Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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presence of people who harbor an opposing viewpoint. This is not a
content-neutral restriction.
What are we to make of Schwitzgebel's "cacophony"
argument? 110 It seems to impose a "one-viewpoint-at-a-time" approach
to forum regulation. Once a permittee is safely ensconced in a traditional
public forum, there can be no expression of rival or dissenting
viewpoints. There is some support in the case law for the one-viewpoint-
at-a-time approach. One finds it in Sanders v. United States,1 ' which
rejected a First Amendment defense by a criminal defendant who was
arrested for physically intruding upon the Pageant for Peace, an annual
event held on the Ellipse, a traditional public forum in Washington, D.C.
Hoping to publicize what he believed were three mysterious deaths in
South Carolina, the defendant ventured without a permit onto the
grounds of the Pageant and, after placing three small signs beneath the
South Carolina Christmas tree, he stood beside the tree with a larger sign
and remained there until being arrested. In language that Schwitzgebel
quotes approvingly, the Sanders court stressed the "fundamental" interest
"in guaranteeing citizens the right to participate in events or
demonstrations of their own choosing without being subjected to
• .,112
interference by other citizens." As if laying the groundwork for the
one-viewpoint-at-a-time approach, the court stressed:
A physical intrusion into another event for the
purpose of interjecting one's own convictions or
beliefs is by definition an interference, regardless
of how insubstantial or insignificant it might
appear. As such, it is an interference with the
rights of other citizens to enjoy the event or
demonstration in which they have chosen to
participate, and in an area reserved for them.
1 3
But a host of authorities directly refute the one-viewpoint-at-a-
time approach as inconsistent with a longstanding First Amendment
109. See Green, supra note 54 at 40; Benke, supra note 54, at 13; Vlahos,
supra note 54.
110. Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1217, 1219.
111. 518 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd mem., 679 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
112. Id. at 730 (quoted in Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1218).
113. Id.
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ideal: promoting the collision of competing viewpoints as the path to
truth.11 4 Thus, courts have recognized First Amendment protection for• 11516
counter-demonstration and even heckling."'
114. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing
that "a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute");
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market").
115. See City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 667 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio 1996)
(rejecting a flat ban on counter-demonstrations and striking down an injunction that
barred the simultaneous presence--on the residential street of accused Nazi war
criminal John Demjanjuk--of demonstrators with opposing views on his
readmission to the United States). In Seven Hills, the trial court had entered the
injunction at the city's behest to prevent Holocaust survivors and the Ku Klux Klan
from airing their diametrically opposing views at the same time in the same place.
Id. at 945-946. See generally Kevin Francis O'Neill & Raymond Vasvari, Counter-
Demonstration as Protected Speech: Finding the Right to Confrontation in Existing
First Amendment Law, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77 (1995) (concluding that
constitutional protection for counter-demonstration may be found in the extant cases
and in the underlying purposes of the First Amendment).
116. See generally In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970) (invoking the First
Amendment to impose a narrowing construction upon California's disturbing-a-
lawful-meeting statute, thereby overturning the convictions of farmworkers who
heckled a congressman during a campaign speech in a public park). See City of
Spokane v. McDonough, 485 P.2d 449 (Wash. 1971) (holding that a disorderly
conduct ordinance could not constitutionally be enforced to punish an attendee at an
outdoor rally who shouted "warmonger" at Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T.
Agnew and, flashing the peace sign at him, yelled: "What the hell do you think this
means?"). To the extent that courts are willing to recognize any First Amendment
protection for heckling, their willingness will very much depend on where the
heckling occurred. If it took place in a traditional public forum (as it did in the
foregoing cases, Kay and Spokane), then the heckler may very well enjoy First
Amendment protection. But if the heckling took place in a non-public forum, the
heckler is likely bereft of protection. See, e.g., Iowa v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677,
679-81 (Iowa 1993) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction of a heckler who
intentionally disrupted a speech by President George Herbert Walker Bush during a
Republican fundraising rally). The Iowa Supreme Court distinguished Kay from the
facts in Hardin, where the defendant's disruptive conduct occurred in an auditorium
filled with persons who had paid for the opportunity to hear the President's speech,
the disruption effectively halted the program, and the defendant was removed and
arrested only after twice being asked to cease his heckling. Id. at 681. See generally
Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Conduct?,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 215 (1986) (collecting cases and proposing an analytical
standard).
In City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations,1 7 the Ohio Supreme
Court rejected a flat ban on counter-demonstrations-in a direct rebuke
to the one-viewpoint-at-a-time approach to forum regulation.
Specifically, the court struck down an injunction that barred the
simultaneous presence-on the residential street of accused Nazi war
criminal John Demjanjuk-of demonstrators with opposing viewpoints
on his readmission to the United States.'18 The trial court had entered the
injunction at the city's behest to prevent Holocaust survivors and the Ku
Klux Klan from airing their diametrically opposing views at the same
time in the same place.' 19 Ultimately, the court concluded that the record
offered insufficient proof of imminent or even likely violence, so that the
counter-demonstration ban offended the First Amendment. 1
20
, ,121
Stressing "[t]he happy cacophony of democracy, In re Kay
directly repudiates Schwitzgebel's sense that cacophony in a traditional
public forum must be avoided at all costs. 12 2 Kay directly addresses the
First Amendment right to heckle an elected representative in a traditional
public forum-which would seem to be precisely the evil that
presidential campaigns seek to avoid in their manipulation of public
forum permits. Kay invoked the First Amendment to impose a
narrowing construction upon California's disturbing-a-lawful-meeting
statute, thereby overturning the convictions of farmworkers who
117. 667 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio 1996).
118. Id. at 946.
119. Id. at 946-47.
120. Id. at 947-48.
121. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 148 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (alteration added)
(quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1968)). Writing for the
Court in Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan spoke in praise of cacophony:
To many, the immediate consequence of [our robust
expressive] freedom may often appear to be only verbal
tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are,
however, within established limits, in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of
open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense,
not a sign of weakness but of strength.
403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (alteration added).
122. Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville, 898 F. Supp. 1208, 1217, 1219
(N.D. Ohio 1995), affdmem., 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996).
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registered their disapproval of a congressman's labor policy by engaging
in rhythmic clapping and shouting for five to ten minutes during his
campaign speech in a city park. 23 The court observed:
[Judicially-recognized limits on free expression do]
not mean ... that the state can grant to the police a
"roving commission" to enforce Robert's Rules of
Order, since other First Amendment interests are
likewise at stake. Audience activities, such as
heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and
booing, even though they may be impolite and
discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of
the First Amendment . . . . An unfavorable
reception, such as that given Congressman Tunney
in the instant case, represents one important
method by which an officeholder's constituents can
register disapproval of his conduct and seek redress
of grievances. The First Amendment contemplates
a debate of important public issues; its protection
can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the
audience must passively listen to a single point of
view. The First Amendment does not merely
insure a marketplace of ideas in which there is but
one seller.
24
In the end, the one-viewpoint-at-a-time approach to forum
regulation reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of First Amendment
jurisprudence. It attempts to impose a prissy insistence that a public
forum speaker must never be ruffled by disagreement, must never be
unsettled by the specter of dissent. This view is utterly foreign to the
Supreme Court's longstanding recognition that public forum speech
frequently entails the clash of competing viewpoints. The Court has
stressed that "a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute"-that it "may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
123. Kay, 464 P.2d at 145.
124. Id. at 147 (citations omitted) (alteration added).
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conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 125 Though "the
process of open debate" may often produce "verbal tumult,"
"cacophony," and "discord," these are the "necessary side effects" of our
commitment to the free exchange of ideas. 126 It is "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and w e-open 127-a commitment that even affords
the speaker some latitude to employ "exaggeration," "vilification," and
"false statement" in attacking public officials. 128 Thus, when a speaker
ventures into a public forum, he should expect a raucous, rough-and-
tumble atmosphere, where the audience need not sit in reverent
129
silence. If his ideas meet with disapproval, observed Justice Douglas,
125. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing breach-
of-the-peace conviction of a widely vilified speaker whose anti-Semitic and racially
inflammatory speech produced a near riot).
126. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (holding that the First
Amendment precluded defendant's breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking
through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft").
127. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (establishing
a qualified protection under the First Amendment for defamatory falsehoods uttered
by critics of official conduct).
128. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (setting aside a
breach-of-the-peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness, who, in the course of his
sidewalk proselytizing, incensed passers-by in playing a phonograph record that
expressed virulently anti-Catholic sentiments).
129. See, e.g., In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970); Dempsey v. People,
117 P.3d 800, 808 (Colo. 2005); City of Spokane v. McDonough, 485 P.2d 449, 450
(Wash. 1971). Moreover, a public forum speaker cannot be denied a permit based
on the likelihood that he will be confronted by a hostile audience. See, e.g., Collin v.
Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that Nazis were
entitled to injunctive relief after city officials denied their application for a permit to
hold a demonstration in a public park); id. at 754-55 ("As to the possibility of there
being hostile audience members causing violence, the law is quite clear that such
considerations are impermissible in determining whether to grant permits .... [I]t is
impermissible even to consider the threat of a hostile audience when ruling on a
permit application or a request for injunction against a demonstration.") (citations
omitted) (alteration added); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala.
1965) (granting injunctive relief to Martin Luther King, Jr. and his fellow civil rights
activists, ordering the State of Alabama to permit and not interfere with plaintiffs'
planned march from Selma to Montgomery); id. at 109 ("The [State's] contention
that there is some hostility to this march will not justify its denial. Nor will the
threat of violence constitute an excuse for its denial.") (alteration added) (internal
citation omitted); Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347,
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"there will commonly be mutterings and unrest and heckling from the
crowd."' 30 "It is neither unusual nor unexpected," wrote Justice Black,
"that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill about, push,
shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare
where controversial topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not
do some or all of these things.' 13 Audience members can be arrested, of
353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (declining to enjoin a group of Nazis from marching through
an Illinois suburb populated by hundreds of Holocaust survivors); id. at 353 (even
though the government put on evidence showing that "if the defendants ever appear
in Skokie to demonstrate, there... is a virtual certainty that thousands of irate Jewish
citizens [will] physically attack [them]," court holds that the possible presence of a
hostile and violent audience is an impermissible consideration in granting an
injunction or withholding a permit) (alteration added); affd in part, rev'd in part,
373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978) (holding that appellate panel correctly refused to enjoin the
Nazi march but erred in barring the Nazis from wearing their uniforms).
130. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Feiner
upheld the disorderly conduct conviction of a college student who, standing atop a
soapbox and using a loudspeaker, delivered a street-corner harangue to a crowd of
eighty people in which his derogatory remarks about President Truman, the
American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local officials inspired a hostile
audience reaction. Id. at 316-18. Voting 6-3, the Court held that the conviction
could be sustained based on the trial court's findings that defendant encouraged his
audience to become racially divided into hostile camps, that the gathering crowd was
interfering with traffic, and that defendant repeatedly refused police requests to cease
talking. Id. at 319-21. The continued vitality of Feiner remains in doubt, given the
Civil Rights Trilogy of the 1960s: Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
(setting aside breach-of-the-peace convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who,
after marching peacefully on a sidewalk around the South Carolina State House
grounds, refused a police order to disperse and, after 15 minutes of singing and
speechmaking, were arrested); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (setting aside
breach-of-the-peace conviction of a civil rights activist who led a peaceful march by
2000 students to a courthouse where, with songs, prayers, and speeches, they
protested the arrest and incarceration of fellow activists who were being held in the
adjacent jail-the demonstration ended in chaos when police fired tear gas at the
students after defendant refused a dispersal order, which was prompted by muttering
and grumbling among 100 to 300 white onlookers positioned across the street);
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (overturning the disorderly conduct
convictions of 85 civil rights protesters whose march to and picketing before the
mayor's residence produced a hostile reaction by 1000 onlookers-Court held that
First Amendment barred the protesters' convictions where, pelted by rocks and eggs,
they remained peaceful throughout their demonstration and were arrested only after
refusing a police dispersal demand prompted solely by the onlookers' unruliness).
131. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 325-26 (Black, J., dissenting).
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course, if they physically attack the speaker,132 but in a public forum they
are certainly free to register their dissent by booing or jeering. 33 If the
speaker does not want to risk being booed or jeered, he is always free to
deliver his speech in a private forum, like a hotel ballroom.
From a practical standpoint, the purpose of a public forum
permit is not to authorize the physical capture of the forum, as if it were
some medieval castle from which the Saracens must be expelled. The
permit is merely a method for ensuring the reasonable sharing of the
forum by multiple speakers. If, for example, a permittee wishes to use
sound amplification equipment for her speech, then the permit system
can be used to require that other speakers who also wish to use sound
amplification equipment must reserve the forum for a different date or
time.' 34 But a public forum permit is not a license to close the forum, or
to exclude citizens who merely wish to listen rather than speak. And it is
certainly not a license to import a hand-picked audience that displaces
the public audience. A principal purpose of the public forum doctrine
was to grant expressive access to certain heavily-traveled public
spaces-spaces that were desirable as a platform for speech because they
received a heavy concentration of pedestrian traffic.' 35 This was the
132. Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 731 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (overturning
refusal-to-disperse convictions of Revolutionary Communist Party demonstrators
who, in the course of a May Day rally, inspired a hostile reaction by 200 onlookers);
id at 731 & n.7 (recognizing that police have a duty to protect unpopular speakers
confronted by a hostile crowd, even to the point of arresting crowd members who
physically threaten the speakers); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 912
(6th Cir. 1975) (sustaining § 1983 action by a solitary anti-Nixon protester whose
sign was destroyed by police at the behest of hostile onlookers); id. at 905-06
(holding that police not only violated the First Amendment by destroying plaintiffs
sign but had an affirmative duty to protect her from the hostile crowd).
133. In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 147; Dempsey, 117 P.3d at 808; McDonough, 485
P.2d at 450.
134. See, e.g., Stokes v. City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1172-73 (7th Cir.
1991) (upholding sound amplification ordinance regulating expressive access to a
traditional public forum in Madison, Wisconsin).
135. The Supreme Court has frequently identified Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) as the inspiration for the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (invoking Hague);
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-14 (1984)
(invoking Hague); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983) (invoking Hague). In his enormously influential plurality opinion in
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characteristic that each of the "traditional" public forums shared. When
the doctrine was first created, public squares, parks, and sidewalks all
afforded the speaker a platform for reaching a concentrated mass of
fellow citizens. 136 Each of those locations afforded the speaker a built-in
Hague, Justice Roberts found a constitutional right to use "streets and parks for
communication of views," Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16, basing that right on the fact
that "streets and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Id. at
515. That Justice Roberts was trying to protect the ability of speakers (even
controversial speakers) to reach a broad public audience is revealed by Hague's
factual context. Hague was a civil lawsuit that challenged the speech-restrictive
policies of Frank "Boss" Hague, the mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey. SAMUEL
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 110 (1990). Mayor Hague was
openly hostile to organized labor and the political left. He tried to suppress the
Communists, the Socialists, the ACLU, and all labor unions, in particular the
militant new Congress of Industrial Organizations ("CIO"). Id. To silence these
groups, he banned them from public spaces-cutting off their communication with
the citizenry. His tactics included: (1) the arbitrary denial of permits to hold public
meetings, assemblies, and demonstrations; (2) police harassment of union picketers;
(3) banning CIO and union leaflets; (4) padlocking a synagogue after a union
meeting had been held there; and (5) evicting union organizers from Jersey City by
giving them one-way train and ferry tickets out of town. Id. As plaintiffs in the
Hague lawsuit, the targeted groups requested injunctive relief against these tactics.
The Supreme Court complied, striking down ordinances that, inter alia, imposed a
flat ban on the distribution of printed materials, and required a permit-issued at the
unfettered discretion of the public safety director-for all public meetings and
demonstrations. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516-18. By vindicating the rights of the
targeted groups to engage in public meetings, demonstrations, leafleting, and
picketing, Hague confirmed the important role played by public spaces in affording
expressive access to the citizenry.
136. See Gey, supra note 9, at 1538-39 (public forum doctrine was designed to
afford speakers access to other citizens for presenting and discussing political ideas);
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 11 (when speakers engage in "mass protest in public places," the
"essential feature is [an] appeal to public opinion") (alteration added); Robert C.
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1719 (1987) (early conceptions of the public forum
doctrine regarded streets and parks as constitutionally important "because they were
peculiarly fitted to foster" speech on public issues); Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L.
LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech about Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing
Public Forum, and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.
L. REV. 179, 184-86 (2001) (public forum doctrine enables a speaker to disseminate
his message to an audience of fellow citizens); Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in
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audience. Thus, the idea of importing an audience--of a speaker
bringing his own audience to displace the public-is a non sequitur in
terms of the public forum doctrine. This is the primary legal flaw in
what the presidential campaigns are doing. They are twisting the public
forum doctrine to achieve a result that is unintelligible and antithetical to
that doctrine. And this is why the televised image they hope to achieve
is so misleading. When we see a presidential candidate speaking to a
large crowd in a public square, our natural and subliminal assumption is
that the crowd is a public audience, not a privately invited, hand-picked
audience. It never enters our minds that the general public has been
expelled from the forum-because we have always equated a public
square with public access. This same assumption rests at the very core of
the public forum doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This article is an effort to analyze a First Amendment issue of
great importance that has somehow escaped the attention of scholars,
judges, and lawyers. The lack of attention it has received is all the more
Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 149, 152, 161 (1998) (public forum doctrine was designed to
afford communicative access to audiences-public forums are locations that are
frequented by the public, locations where a speaker can reach a public audience).
See also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down ordinances
that prohibited leafleting without a license and gave municipal officials unfettered
discretion to grant or deny such a license); id. at 163 (due to their public character,
"streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion"). Stressing that the public forum doctrine is derived as much from the
Assembly Clause as from the Speech Clause, Justice Kennedy has observed:
Public places are of necessity the locus for discussion of
public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary
government action. At the heart of our jurisprudence lies
the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the
right to gather and speak with other persons in public
places. The recognition that certain government-owned
property is a public forum provides open notice to citizens
that their freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a
censorial government, adding tangible reinforcement to the
idea that we are a free people.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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puzzling given its prominent use by presidential election campaigns,
which receive more publicity than any other aspect of American political
life. Through the simple expedient of a permit, these campaigns have
managed to "privatize" public squares, excluding citizens in a viewpoint-
discriminatory manner that would be patently unconstitutional if carried
out by the government. But since the government issues the very permit
that purportedly authorizes such viewpoint discrimination, there is a
genuine question as to whether the First Amendment can be so easily
evaded. In offering my own analysis here, I have tried to remain true to
the letter and the spirit of the public forum doctrine. It is my hope that
this article will encourage lawyers, journalists, and scholars to look more
carefully at the way that presidential campaigns have been manipulating
traditional public forums. And it is my hope that this article will prove
useful to any judges who are called on to confront this issue in a court of
law.
